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Symposium: Metamorphosis of Artists' Rights in the Digital Age
Artists Don't Get No Respect): Panel on Attribution and Integrity
Moderator: Robert Clarida
Panelists:
Jonathan Band
Partner, Morrison & Foerster
Jonathan Band is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Morrison & Foerster,
LLP. Mr. Band's areas of practice include intellectual property, administrative and
appellate litigation, Internet regulation and legislation. Mr. Band also has advised
clients on Internet issues including spam, privacy, gambling and indecency. Mr.
Band is the co-author of Interfaces on Trial: Intellectual Property and
Interoperability in the Global Software Industry, published by Westview Press, and
over fifty articles on intellectual property and Internet topics. He is an adjunct
professor at Georgetown University Law Center, and he serves on the Editorial
Board of The Computer and Internet Lawyer. Mr. Band received his B.A., magna
cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, from Harvard College and a J.D. from Yale Law
School. He is admitted to practice in the District of Columbia and California and
before the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Eighth,
Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits. In 2003, Mr. Band filed a brief before the
U.S. Supreme Court on behalf of the American Library Association and other
groups in Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox.
Rebecca Tushnet
Assistant Professor, New York University Law School
Rebecca Tushnet is an assistant professor at the New York University School of
Law, visiting at Georgetown University Law School 2004-2006. After clerking for
Chief Judge Edward R. Becker of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
Philadelphia and Associate Justice David H. Souter of the U.S. Supreme Court, she
practiced intellectual property law at Debevoise & Plimpton before joining the
NYU faculty. Her publications include Copy This Journal: How Fair Use Doctrine
Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It (Yale L.J. 2004), Copyright as a
Model for Free Speech Law (B.C. L. Rev. 2000) and Legal Fictions: Copyright,
Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law (Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 1997). Her work
currently focuses on the relationship between the First Amendment and copyright
I.

This play on words is attributed to Rodney Dangerfield.
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and false advertising law. She has advised and represented several fan fiction
websites in disputes with copyright and trademark owners. She is also an expert on
the law of engagement rings.
Eugene Mopsik
Executive Director, American Society ofMedia Photographers

Eugene Mopsik, a successful Philadelphia corporate/industrial photographer, took
up his appointment as Executive Director of the American Society of Media
Photographers (ASMP) in January of 2003. Since joining ASMP in 1975, Mr.
Mopsik has played a key role in the organization's activities from chapter to
national levels. Prior to his appointment as Executive Director, Mr. Mopsik served
on ASMP's board of directors, including a term as president in 2000-2001. Mr.
Mopsik frequently participates in trade association panel discussions and has
spoken at the University of the Arts, Moore College of Art, and Drexel University.
Recently, he has been involved in discussions with the New York Times regarding
its new freelance contract and has worked to create new agreements between
photographers and the American Institute of Architects (AlA) regarding the rights
to images submitted for various AlA competitions. Mr. Mopsik received his B.S. in
Economics from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Contrary
to the good advice of family, friends, and the Philadelphia Small Business
Development Center, he proceeded with his chosen career in commercial
photography. His photography work was primarily corporate/industrial for such
clients as Mack Trucks, MitsubishilFuso, Hyster Company, Ingersoll-Rand, Reed
Publishing and Citicorp.

MODERATOR: First we're going to be talking about the Dastar decision. 2
The Dastar decision was issued last summer by the U.S. Supreme Court, which
addresses the issue of how, if at all, does section 43(a) of the Lanham Ac~ apply to
works of authorship when they're imbedded in tangible products? The decision left
a lot of people scratching their heads because section 43(a) was supposed to be an
important part of the U.S. commitment to respect moral rights when we joined the
Berne Convention in 1989. And now in the wake of Dastar, it seems that that may
no longer be possible. You may remember the Gilliam against ABC case involving
the Monty Python episodes that had been edited for television?4 What's the fate of
a decision like that in the wake of Dastar? Is there still a viable claim for
misattribution of an artistic work after Dastar? We will tum to Professor Band for
a more thorough examination of this conflict.
BAND: I am going to dicuss not only the Dastar decision but also the Family

2.
3.
4.

Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Company, 538 F.2d 14 (2d Circuit 1976).
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Movie Ac~ and the Clear Play litigation6 and other legislation that also has an
impact on this whole issue of moral rights. Now when people discuss moral rights,
they're usually talking about two things. One is the right of integrity, in other
words, the author's right to prevent other people from changing the work, distorting
the work, mutilating it, putting it in an unfavorable light, that kind of thing. And
second, they might be discussing the right of attribution, meaning whenever the
work is reproduced or re-disseminated, the author's name is always attached to it.
Certainly in the continental European view of copyrights and moral rights are
extremely important. Copyright in Europe is seen in many ways as an extension of
the author's personality, and, therefore, rights of integrity and attribution are
extremely important. European countries are also part of the Berne Convention. 7
If a lot of you have taken a copyright class here, you may have heard that there are
virtually no moral rights in the United States, and, certainly, our general approach
to copyright is very different from the European approach. We have much more of
an economic incentive based model as opposed to this continental view that
copyright is really about protecting the author's personality or the extension of the
author's personality. This has created a very different orientation. But to some
extent there has always been some recognition of moral rights in the United States.
Historically, the right of integrity in the United States has been guaranteed
through the right to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work. In
copyright law, this is covered by section 106(2) which says that a derivative work
right is part of the bundle of rights that belongs to the copyright owner. 8 In
addition, section 106(a), the Visual Artist's Rights Act,9 gives added protections
that you don't find anywhere else in the Copyright Act. This is seen as the basic
framework for all works and their owner's moral rights: you have the right to
prepare derivative works and you have specialized rights in the Visual Artist's
Rights Act.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is one of these catch-all provisions at the end
of the trademark law, and it is usually used for the doctrine of passing-off, and it is
the type of trademark violation or misappropriation that you typically see. \0 So, for
example, let's imagine that I decided to go into the watch making business. No one
would want to buy a Band watch. So let's say I started labeling it Rolex. Let's say
I started putting the label Rolex on it. That would be passing-off. I would be
passing-off my product as if it were a Rolex watch and that would obviously be a
bad thing to do and that would, in addition to being a violation of other parts of the
trademark law, to the extent that Rolex is registered, it would also be passing-off in

5.

Family Movie Act of2004, H.R. 4586, 108th Congo (2d Sess. 2004).

6. See Rick Lyman, Hollywood Balks at High-Tech Sanitizers; Some Video Customers Want
Tamer Films, and Entrepreneurs Rush to Comply, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,2002, at E2 (describing the
litigation initiated against Clearplay).
7. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at
Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979.
8. 17 U .S.c. § I 06(2) (2000).
9.
[d. § 106(a).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
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violation of section 43 of the Lanham Act.
Reverse passing-off is a little different. It's kind of a counter intuitive notion.
Let's say I was trying to make everyone think that Band watches were really good
watches. So, conceivably, I would buy Rolex watches and label them as Band
watches, and then they would go into the marketplace, and you would have all
these product reviewers that say "Hey, these Band watches are really good!" Now
obviously, in the long term, that would be a pretty bad strategy because I'd have to
spend 1,000 dollars a watch to buy the Rolex and only sell it for 100 bucks. But,
conceivably, over time, once I build up my brand, I might be able to switch and
then sell the crummy watches that I was importing from Taiwan, and I could still
have the Band label. People would remember the good Band watches which were
in fact really Rolex watches. That's the doctrine of reverse passing-off that
happens much more rarely, and again there's always kind of a unique market
situation why a person would have an incentive for reverse passing-off.
At some point, smart lawyers realized that the doctrine of reverse passing-off
could be used in the attribution context. Now remember, there is no specific right
of attribution under the U.S. copyright law, but, in various cases, people were able
to start using the reverse passing-off doctrine as a way of making sure that they
gained attribution. For example, people in the entertainment industry would say,
"look, I want to make sure that I get credit when my work is being distributed," and
they would argue that "if the work was distributed without my name on it then and
it was distributed as if someone else were the producer, or the director or the
author" and therefore this was reverse passing-off.
Then a split emerged between the Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit in terms
of how much needed to be taken before you could make this reverse passing-off
claim. The Ninth Circuit rule was that if a person engaged in bodily appropriation
of someone else's work and then put his name on it, that was reverse passing-off. I I
The Second Circuit used a substantial similarity standard. The substantial
similarity standard resembles the test for copyright infringement. The Second
Circuit imported the substantial similarity standard for copyright infringement into
this reverse passing-off context. 12 So in other words, if a publisher published a
book that was substantially similar to my book but then put my name on it, not only
would I have a copyright claim against that publisher, but I might also have a
Lanham Act claim that he was reverse passing-off.
So, you had the circuit split, and then the Dastar case came along. Now it's
interesting that these cases especially always arose where there was a reason for the
copyright claim not to work. That was the case in the Dastar case. Twentieth
Century Fox converted the memoirs of Dwight D. Eisenhower into a TV series. At
some point, however, Fox screwed up the renewal of the copyright. And so even
though Eisenhower still had a copyright in the underlying memoirs on which the
TV series was based, Fox lost its copyright in the series itself.
Dastar decided to make its own miniseries of video cassettes based on the

II.
12.

See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F. 2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990).
See Waldman Publishing Corp. v. LandoU, Inc., 43 F.. 3d 775 (2d Cir. 1994).
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Twentieth Century Fox series. They took the Fox footage and added some of their
own stuff, and they distributed it on videocassette. Fox sued along with
Eisenhower's estate. The Eisenhower case proceeded forward because the
copyright was still good. But Fox's case, at least the copyright part, was dismissed
because Fox had not renewed its copyright. Fox pressed forward with a Lanham
Act claim. It said that Dastar was engaged in reverse passing-off. It argued that
Dastar was claiming that the Fox footage is Dastar product and that violates
Twentieth Century Fox's rights of attribution. Dastar had never attributed the
footage to Twentieth Century Fox.
The Ninth Circuit ruled against Dastar, which sent it up to the Supreme Court.
Everyone assumed that the decision would focus on the standard to be applied in
attribution cases: do you use the Ninth Circuit standard of bodily appropriation or
do you use the Second Circuit standard of substantial similarity? The lawyers for
Dastar, sort of as a tertiary argument, argued well, "you know, there really should
be no reverse passing-off argument at all under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
because it doesn't comport with the way the statute's written." No one really took
that argument seriously except for Justice Scalia. He ruled that section 43(a) does
not create a cause of action for non-attribution. l3 Although he didn't throw out
reverse passing-off all together, he did say that it didn't create a cause of action for
non-attribution when you were dealing with communicative products. In other
words, when you were dealing with copyrightable works, there was no reverse
passing-off protection. He came to this conclusion by looking very carefully at the
wording of the statute. The statute, he argued, discusses misrepresenting what was
the origin of the good. He argued the "good" was the videotape cassette and the
videotape cassette is made by Dastar. Dastar, in fact, is the entity that is making
the videocassette. Therefore, it is not engaged in reverse passing-off.
The informational content stored on the videocassette came from Twentieth
Century Fox, but Justice Scalia argued that the footage is not what section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act protects. The question is where did this good come from? The
good, which is this videotape came from Dastar. So, the essence of the Dastar
decision is that you could no longer use section 43(a) of the Lanham Act when you
were dealing at least with the distribution of hard copy because either the book
would be coming from the publisher who actually printed it or the videotape is
coming from whoever is actually making and distributing the videotape cassette.
Now, you have to look at who is making the physical object as opposed to what is
the source of the informational content. And Scalia sort of justified this saying, if
this were not the case, the Lanham Act would be creating a species of mutant
copyright law.
The other very powerful image in the Dastar opinion is the problem of giving
attribution and how far back do you go? If you base a book on a movie, and then
the movie itself was based on something else, and that was based on some folk tale,
the question is how far back do you go? Scalia argued that such a quest was like

13.

Dastar corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 36 (2003)
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looking for the source of the Nile. 14 Both of these images (of mutant copyright law
and the source of the Nile) were taken directly from the petitioner's brief-but he
failed to attribute them.
Now to the Clearplay issue. We will need the right of integrity which really
derives from the right that the author has to make derivative works. Clearplay is a
small company in Utah which has developed software which is loaded in a special
kind of DVD player which automatically skips content that the user decides is
offensive. IS For example, the user rents Saving Private Ryan and the user decides
it's too bloody and uses the Clearplay technology (which has fourteen different
filters to choose from) to omit offensive content. The technology works by having
someone at Clearplay code the movie and creates the filter to run with the particular
movie and then the user decides what filters to use.
Now, once Clearplay put this on the market, it got the angry letters from
individual directors and from the Directors' Guild of America claiming that this
technology was a violation of the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act although they
were not necessarily very clear on what the theory was. 16 They were just
complaining that the product was wrong and Clearplay should stop distribution. As
a result, Clearplay and a few other companies producing the product filed a
declaratory judgment action still pending in Colorado.17 If you examine the
various counterclaims that were filed by the directors, the precise legal theory
changes. It varies from direct infringement to contributory infringement to the
right to create derivative works to a user's creation of a derivative work. This
might reflect that there is not a strong basis for the director's claims, but, in any
case, these motions are still pending.
Because this litigation has gotten quite a bit of attention, and it precipitated the
introduction of the Family Movie Act l8 by Chairman Lamar Smith who is the
Chairman of the House Intellectual Property Subcommittee. And, in essence, the
legislation says that if you have a technology that allows this kind of skipping over
offensive contents such a technology is not in violation of the Copyright Act or the
Lanham Act. The Act would immunize the Clearplay technology from suit.
There was a hearing before the House IP Subcommittee about this bill on the
17th of June,19 and I just want to summarize some of the testimony. Mary Beth
Peters, the Register of Copyrights, testified against the bill arguing that the
legislation is premature-after all, there had not been a decision in the litigation.
There was therefore no reason to have legislation responding to litigation before
you have any kind of decision. She expressed great ambivalence about the

14. Id.
15. See Clearplay, http://www.c1earplay.com (last visited May IS, 2004).
16. Documents for the litigation are available at Director's Guild of America, Archives (Sept. 20,
2002) at http://www.dga.orginews/pcexpand.php3?2SI.
17. Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. filed Oct. 2S, 2002).
IS. Family Movie Act of 2004, H.R. 45S6, IOSth Congo (2d Sess. 2004).
19. Family Movie Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R. 4586 Before the House Subcomm. On Courts. the
Internet and Intellectual Property. 10Sth Congo 111 (2004), available at http://www.copyright.gov/
docs/regstat061704.pdf[hereinafter Family Movie Act Hearings).
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technology. She argued that if the user was so concerned about the offensive
content of the DVD, he had a choice to buy the product. If you are going to rent or
buy the DVD, the user should respect the vision of the director. Peters also didn't
like the notion that a business was being built on other people's content. In other
words, Clearplay was building its business model on the content that the various
studios were producing.
Peters also insinuated that Clearplay was violating moral rights in changing the
way the movie was perceived. Steven Spielberg, when he made Saving Private
Ryan, made it the way he wanted to make it using his artistic vision. Clearplay is
allowing users to change the director's artistic vision. Peters said that even though
it's contrary to the principle of moral rights, it doesn't actually violate any moral
rights from V ARA because it takes place in the context of a private performance,
and the omissions are relatively minor, and the user is aware that this was not the
director's artistic vision.
Peters then discussed whether Clearplay indeed violated existing copyright law.
She argued that it was not an infringement of the reproduction right because no
copies of the DVD are being made. Because of the way the technology operates,
the DVD player plays the DVD and when it gets to the offensive "byte" it simply
skips over it. Second, Peters argued that there was no infringement of performance
right because the viewing was a private performance. The technology was
typically used in the home.
Peters then confronted and discussed in depth whether Clearplay was an
infringement of the derivative work right. Again, she argued that there was no
public performance or fixation. There is a split in the circuits right now on whether
someone violates the derivative work right even if a copy is never made. 2o In
addition, the Clearplay software isn't a derivative work because the software itself
doesn't include the underlying work. The code of the software simply indicates
where to skip; it tells the DVD player skip at byte 45, byte 200, etc.
Jack Valente, who is the former president of the MPAA, also testified against
the bill. 21 He argued the Clearplay technology did contribute to infringement of the
derivative work right, and he pointed to the fact that you could design the software
to skip for any purpose, not only offensive content. His view was let the market
and industry negotiations work this out. Let Clearplay negotiate some kind of
license with the studios rather than Congress meddle with it.
Notwithstanding the testimony of Valente and Mary Beth Peters, the House of
Representatives passed the bill anyway. The bill indicates that as long as you don't
make a permanent copy of the edited work, it's not infringement, either of
copyright or trademark law. The two limitations are simply that: (1) you can't have
a fixed copy of the altered version, and (2) that no changes, deletions or additions
are made to commercial advertisement. So in other words, you're able to skip the
artistic vision of the artist. But heaven forbid that the software skip over a

20. Compare Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of America, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), with
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l.lnc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
21. Family Movie Act Hearings, supra note 19.
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commercial! The Family Movie Act was passed by the House in September, and
then it moved to the Senate. In the Senate, it was part of HR-239I which was sort
of an omnibus intellectual property bill. The bill did not pass the Senate before the
Senate adjourned, and one of the reasons why it didn't pass was because of the
commercial skipping language. So this whole IP bill collapsed in large measure
because of that little provision. The Senate will have another chance to address the
bill after the election. 22
TUSHNET: I actually wanted to talk about fan creativity and its relationship to
attribution, drawing on what came out of Dastar. I say fan creativity, and not fan
fiction, because one of the things that broadband has brought us is what I like to
call fan creativity. No longer do fans who want to share their creations with other
fans of the same television show or movie or book have to attend a convention. No
longer do they just share their new stories, they can also share arts they've drawn,
photographs they've manipulated, and, my current favorite, music videos made
with clips from the film, re-cut, re-edited into a new story to the accompaniment of
music. And that's why I'm going to say fan creativity at this point.
I focused before solely on the fiction, because that was almost all of what was
out there. Now there's much more. When I was considering the question of the
moral right to attribution and how unauthorized fan creativity relates to that
concept, it struck me that there are two interesting issues from a theoretical
perspective. The first is: who gets the credit? When I was in law school and
discovered fan fiction, the reason why I got into intellectual property was because
most of these stories had a disclaimer-no copyright infringement intended, these
characters aren't mine, I'm not making any money, please don't sue. And as a
student, my question was--<loes that work? Is that good enough? I was interested
in these disclaimers because copyright law does not have an explicit place in the
fair use test for evaluating disclaimers as a factor favoring a defense in the way that
trademark law does. I, nonetheless, concluded that, in general, fan fiction was
going to be fair use. It has yet to be litigated to any particular conclusion.
Although cease and desist letters do so still go out, and fans still either comply or
they say no, generally there is no result. That is, I think a lot of the copyright
owners are unwilling to deal with the publicity and the possibility of finding this as
fair use in a litigated case.
Anyway, one of the things I've noticed over the past seven years is that the
disclaimers seem to be becoming less common. Fans just launch right into their
creation. Is this a sign of increasing disrespect for intellectual property meaning
another side effect of the "Napsterization" of Internet culture? I concluded that the
answer is no, not necessarily.
I want to go to the title of this panel-"Authors Don't Get No Respect." Do we
think that Mr. Band is a plagiarist because he didn't say "Authors Don't Get No
Respect," c.f. Rodney Dangerfield? No, of course we don't because we all knew
the reference. And just as we know the reference, no one who reads the fan story

22. Congress enacted the ClearPlay legislation this year as Family Entertainment and Copyright
Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, § 167, 119 Stat. 218 (2005).
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or looks at a piece of fan art on the Internet is likely to think that fan made up
Superman, or Harry Potter. It is the social context that provides the disclaimer
inherently in the production, not necessarily an explicit reference.
The existence of social practices about attribution could potentially solve the
problem in Dastar that Justice Scalia cribbed: tracing the source of the Nile. We
could have a social consensus about when attribution is important, and that could
actually limit the nightmarish problem of finding out who really created the
documentary edition in Dastar. Fox might not have won if we look at social
practices of attribution, since probably people don't care that much. In fact, Fox
didn't even make the documentary-Fox bought the rights. So to say that Fox is
the proper source doesn't make sense even if we assume that people care about who
is the source of the footage.
Attribution doesn't have to be explicit to give credit if the audience knows the
source of the material. This ties into the idea of materiality which is more
important in false advertising law than it is in trademark law. However, it plays a
role here mainly whether people care about where the material they're looking at
comes from. Literary or creative source is material to audiences in a different way
than trademark ordinarily expects. That is, let's assume that you are faced with two
big thick novels, both of which say Tom Clancy on the cover. One of them is a
pirate copy of The Hunt for Red October, by a pirate publisher, not sending any
money back to Tom Clancy, not authorized. But it is nonetheless "the book." And
then you have another novel that says Tom Clancy on the cover, it's from Tom
Clancy's publisher, Tom Clancy gets money when it's sold, but it's not written by
Tom Clancy-it's written by somebody else. Now, which one of those is the Tom
Clancy novel? I think a lot of us would feel that the pirate copy has a stronger
moral claim to be a Tom Clancy novel and a stronger claim of attribution than the
legitimate one. Because what we care about was who came up with the work.
Similarly, I think that as a matter of social practice, nobody cared where Scalia got
this language from in Dastar because the point of the brief was to get into the
opinion. That's the best thing that could possibly have happened to the language in
the brief. So who cares about attribution? This kind of variation in social norms
about attribution is not the same as with ordinary trademarks. To say what I said
about the Clancy novel, it would be ridiculous to say the same thing about a
counterfeit Chanel handbag. And that's one of the reasons that attribution
fundamentally doesn't fit in the scheme as it was set up under the Lanham Act
which is a trademark-focused scheme.
While the first half of this discussion was based on who gets the credit, the
second is who gets the blame? What happens when there's stuff we don't like?
This is a concern in fan creativity, often when the fan introduce sexuality into
places-a romance between Captain Kirk and Mr. Spock is sort of the standard
example. So, obviously, Viacom does not want that to be the official interpretation
of the relationship. So, who's responsible for that interpretation, when fans write
stories in which Kirk and Spock are lovers? Well, trans formative use has been
defined in copyright law as adding new material that reflects critically on the
original and produces a new work. And, the court has distinguished between
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parody, which has a strong claim to fair use, and satire which has a much weaker
claim. Parody comments on the work itself. Satire just uses the work to criticize
something else. But that means that transformative use and parody critically
depend on what was already in the work. A parody or a transformative work is a
work in which subtext becomes text. "Sexualizing Barbie" (which happens in a
number of cases that MatteI has los~3) is another example when a court finds fair
use, it tends to say "of course, it's obvious that you could find sexuality in Barbie,
even though MatteI doesn't want to admit it." Clearly she started as a sex toy and
has not changed so much from it.
Using transformativeness in fiction may give the author the unkindest cut of all
because the court holds when the use is trans formative that the interpretation was in
the text all along-it was therefore the audience to define all along.
To bring this back to the fan creativity, I think fan creators have the same sort of
sense about their work as the courts when they talk about transformative use. They
also have to goal of finding the original elements that spur their creative work. So
one of the elements of critical debate in evaluating fan works among fans is, is it a
good characterization? Does the fan creation sound like Kirk and Spock? Does
this sound like characters in Harry Potter? So even if they are having sex, does it
seem like something Kirk and Spock would do? And that idea of good
characterization is that the fan creator is just finding something that was in the text
all along and making a plausible extension. I think these are puzzles for concepts
of fair use and certainly of moral rights, because we do want to let people have
interpretations of works but we do have to recognize that the interaction between
the audience and the text is complicated and may end up in ways that the author
didn't intend.
MOPSIK: Over the years the American Society of Media Photographers
(ASMP) has worked closely with the registrar of copyright to try to effect changes
beneficial to working photographers. We worked very closely to effect the passage
of the changes in 1976. And beyond that, we were instrumental in the copyright
author regulations that allow for group registration of published images which was
a very big issue for photographers. One of the reasons that attribution, in
particular, is important to commercial photographers is that it, in many ways, is
keyed to proper compensation. For the most part, our members are not as
concerned with integrity, although I do have a bunch of good examples involving
that. But generally, a commercial photographer licenses the use of an image for a
particular use over particular time for a certain number of times. He may be
compensated on the space, he may be compensated on the size of the press run and
the use.
But whether or not that image is cropped, modified or recombined, for the most
part, is not an issue for the photographer. A photographer licenses that image for
that commercial use and only in certain cases would the client not be able to pretty
much use it as they see fit. Recently, we had the case of running a group of archive
images in our quarterly publication of Bulletin, and we had to contact Richard
23.

See Mattei, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F. 3d 792 (9th CiT. 2003).
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Avedon shortly before his death. A vedon was a photographer who could certainly
control the integrity of his images by the sheer force of his reputation within the
marketplace. And one of the issues that A vedon raised with us was: if we are going
to run a very famous photograph of his, Nastasha Kinski and the Snake, no other
photograph could appear on the same page with his. We could have text on that
page, but no other photographs.
And that worked fine for us because we just moved all our text onto that page
and then ran other images in other pages. We had four pages of photographs. But
you know that's an incidence where a photographer can exercise that kind of will.
Those cases are the exception.
Generally images don't appear with credit except in editorial market and
frequently in textbooks. With the exception of someone like Annie Leibowitz who
did the "Got Milk" campaign featuring people with white mustaches, photographs
of the famous personalities have no identification of the photographer. The Annie
Liebowitz photographs have a very fine line that identifies who the personality is
and identifies her as the photographer. Generally, though, in advertising, images
appear without attribution. The same thing is applicable in collaborative material
and sales brochures. Occasionally, or not uncommonly, in the back of annual
reports, there will be a very small photo-credit. But you rarely see on-page credits
or coincidental credits or copyright notices for photographers.
In newspapers, you generally have on-page credit, but it is becoming
complicated because now you've got a photographer's name along with the name
of his photo agency. In certain cases, there will be no credit for the photographer,
but it will be just the stock agency that is credited. One of the issues with the
credits especially in the editorial market is that the editorial market is at the low end
of compensation for photographers and part of the compensation, effectively, is
having that on-page credit. So if you are doing a work for the New York Times, and
you know that you are not being compensated (from a cash stand point) at the
reasonable level, part of the compensation is the fact that here you are in the New
York Times with its extraordinary distribution and the prestige that the Times
carries and you have a photo credit there. So then your corporate clients or other
clients may see this and attribute to you some additional value and that allows you
to further promote your services. So, when you don't have that credit or cash,
you're really coming out short in the editorial market.
One of the big problems facing photographers in the digital environment is the
tracking of images. There are certain exit data that can be attached to images, but
currently there is no way to keep that information from being stripped. So as the
image moves from the photographer to the client or moves from the stock agency
to a licensed user, the attribution information can be stripped.
Most photo-manipulation programs bury the attribution information, and you
have to go in and dig it out. At the same time, it is very easy to strip from the file
and therefore is difficult for the photographer to track uses and changes.
When a client purchases a license for an image, the image is sitting in some art
director's hard drive. The paperwork that describes the license granted is probably
either in accounting office or some art buyer's office. So, down the line, if
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someone wants to use the image, it becomes a real project to try to connect
whatever the license was with the image and that further leads to abuse of copyright
in the market.
There are other programs such as Google's "Image Search" program. You can
go into Google right now, click on "Images" and type in a key word, for example,
the Statue of Liberty. Up will come pages and pages of thumbnail images out of
context without attribution. You can take those thumbnails and drag and drop them
right off the page and put them anywhere. If you click on the image, it takes you to
the image in context, at which point a little disclaimer comes up top saying that this
image may be copyrighted, but in any case it greatly facilitates access to images.
Also mentioned in the previous panel discussion was Amazon's "Look-Insidethe-Book feature." What Mr. Taylor talked about was how authors can either grant
permission or ask that those excerpts to be taken down from Amazon. The problem
for our members is that frequently there are images on those pages that are
uploaded to the web, and we don't know of any occasions where Amazon has gone
to the rights holders of those images and ask for permission to put them up there.
They try to seek permission for the written content but not for the visual content.
You may have been aware earlier, well, in today's New York Times page A22,
under advertising, a headline reads "Bush Campaign Replaces Ad that had
Doctored Images.,,24
It was a case of a photograph of Bush speaking to an assembled group, and
within the group, they literally added more soldiers to give a greater military
presence to the image. Another case earlier this year was an image purported to be
an AP wire photo of young John Kerry and Jane Fonda sitting side by side, with
Jane Fonda speaking. 25 It turned out that these two images were taken by separate
photographers, a year apart, at total different locations. Fonda was speaking
indoors, and in fact she was standing. Kerry was in fact seated at a table. The
images were taken back in 1970 and 1971. 26 They were recombined to come up
with a single image that was circulated to the Internet, and was picked up by the
news outlets and papers until it was verified by the actual photographers that this
image in fact never existed. But it is just so easy right now using Photoshop to
create images that have just incredible veracity. Previously it was much more
difficult. You could do great retouching years ago but it was expensive.
Now this kind of recombination work and retouching is within easy reach of
mass markets. Ken Light who was one of the photographers of the Kerry
photographs wrote a Washington Post editorial Feb. 28, 2004~ He said that, "It's
not that photographic imagery was ever unquestionable in its veracity; as long as
pictures have been made from photographic film, people have known how to alter
images by cropping. But what I've been trying to teach my students about how easy

24. Jim Rutenberg, Bush Campaign Rep/aces Ad That Had Doctored Images, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
29,2004, at A I.
25. See John Rockwell, Artifice Can Be Art's Ally as Well as Its Enemy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2004, at E4.
26. Id.
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and professional-looking these distortions of truth have become in the age of
Photoshop-and how harmful the results can be-had never hit me so personally as
the day I found out somebody had pulled my Kerry picture off my agency's Web
site, stuck Fonda at his side, and then used the massive, unedited reach of the
Internet to distribute it all over the world.'>27
There was another case of a photographer named Leigh Fuphorse, a buddy of
mine from Philadelphia. He took the photograph of Fonda seated in the foreground
with Kerry kind of soft in the background at a rally which is an actual unretouched
image. The image was placed with Corbis, a large stock agency, and it was lifted
from their archives and used by anti-Kerry forces to show his alliance to Fonda.28
One of the things on the horizon right now which seeks to solve some of these
issues is an initiative called PLUS, which stands for Picture Licensing Universal
System. 29 The PLUS Coalition is an inter-organization worldwide group working
cooperatively to create and disseminate a universal picture licensing language for
the benefit to picture licensors and licensees alike. It creates a series of
classification codes for certain uses and then all of this information is embedded
with the image and travels with it. And it is hoped in the long run that this kind of
efforts will mediate some of the issues that we are facing right now.
BAND: I just wanted to mention actually that I completely agree with the point
made about how attribution has a social context and how it varies widely. The
petitioners in Dastar case were thrilled that Justice Scalia used their metaphors.
They probably wouldn't have minded ifhe had dropped a footnote and given them
a little credit. But certainly given that the main goal was to advance clients'
interests, and their clients' interests were hugely advanced by his using their
metaphors, that made the difference. But there is a difference between legal
academia, where every sentence in a law journal should be footnoted, and legal
practice, where you have Justice Scalia taking things from other people or you even
have initiatives.
Some controversy is how some courts now issue findings of fact. When you get
out to practice, a lot of times in litigation, the court will ask each side to give its
own proposal of findings of law and facts. To some extent, a good judge will take
a little bit from here and there and actually do their own work and comes the
decision. But there are incidents where courts have wholesale-adopted one side's
findings of law and findings of facts and then the decision was appealed on that
basis. Most of the reviewing courts would say such a practice is ok because the
parties agreed to such a process. But some courts have thought that it is improper.
Another area whether context makes a huge difference is popular history versus
academic history. Again, academic history is very heavily footnoted (not as bad as
a law journal), but you have to indicate where you got every fact, where you got
every idea or other people who had similar ideas. Whereas in popular history there
are no footnotes and no attribution. You are not supposed to infringe copyrights,

27.
28.
29.

Ken Light, Fonda, Kerry and Photo Fakery, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2004, at A21.
[d.
PLUS at http://www.useplus.org (last visited May 17,2005).
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but it is perfectly acceptable to copy as long as you are not copying expression.
MODERATOR: That brings out something that I wanted to ask you about in
connection with Dastar. You were talking about reverse passing-off and the
example that you gave was buying Rolex and put your name on it as reverse
passing-off and it doesn't make a lot of economic sense for you to do that.
But it seems to me that in the context of communicative product, which is what
you were talking about in Dastar, it makes a lot of sense for you to put your name
on somebody else's work. This is a very different transaction and you have vast
incentives to take credit for somebody else's work. In the aesthetic context, you
want to say look at me, I made this great thing. In the context of watches, it is not
gonna cost you thousand dollars to buy a Rolex.
TUSHNET: Not just in aesthetic context. Judges and partners are often quite
willing to do the same thing.
MODERATOR: I am talking about communicative works, as opposed to hard
goods. I don't know that it is a silly idea that you treat the two so differently, and
what Justice Scalia did in Dastar, to say it makes no difference, goods are good,
origins are origins. Attribution can have a lot of value in one context and not in the
other.
I was also going to ask you a question about an area that you didn't get into and
that has come up in my practice which is not so much fan creativity about fictional
characters as about real people. There is certainly a lot out there. One of my
clients is a broadcaster, and a number of on-air personalities are frequently the
subject of very elaborate pornography which is written about and sold on the
internet.
There was the decision of Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,3o where there was a
parody of Reverend Falwell in the Hustler magazine. And Hustler won the case on
First Amendment grounds in the defamation context. That wasn't a right of
publicity context where you are actually selling or making commercial use of
someone else's name or likeness. I am wondering whether you feel that the First
Amendment should be applied differently when it is a real person as opposed to
fictional characters.
TUSHNET: I guess under current laws it is actually an easier case with a real
person because there is no property the person can point to. I am actually very
aware of this stuff that is available for free about the real people. If you are not
selling it, then any right of publicity claim faces insurmountable barriers, and this is
probably as it should be. That is, I think right of publicity makes most sense when
somebody is trying to use a celebrity's persona to sell something of their own that
the celebrity did not endorse
MODERATOR: Let me ask you a question, Mr. Band, about the Clearplay
situation and about the legislation and litigation. As I recall the facts, there was a
parallel practice going on where people actually bought tangible tapes and snipped
out the parts they did not like, and then put them back together, and made them
available. Is that litigation still going on to your knowledge and is that addressed
30.

Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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by this legislation?3l
BAND: The litigation is complicated, because there are a lot of judgment
actions and there are a lot of different practices and technologies. You can imagine
three different scenarios. One is the Clearplay software where no copies are being
made-the technology simply skips over the original content. Another extreme is
where I buy a DVD, I make a copy of it and I edit things out. That clearly is a
infringing derivative work rights and infringing reproduction rights. The scenario I
pose is the middle case where I buy a copy and I pay for it, and I made changes to it
and sell that copy. So I am not infringing reproduction rights because I started with
one copy and edited one copy. But I have changed the ways the copy looks and I
think there is a defendant and a plaintiff in this case that did have that practice.
There has been no resolution of this case. I think there is precedent that would
support both outcomes given there is a one-to-one relationship because you started
with one copy and you ended with one copy. I am least sympathetic with the third
situation. Given that you end up with a fixed changed copy, I think there would be
an infringement of copyrights.
TUSHNET: My reaction is that you are descriptively correct that there is a
spectrum under current law. It is silly as a policy matter for there to be a spectrum.
The consumer who buys the edited DVD experiences the same thing as the
consumer who buys the software that produces the edited DVD. It is socially
wasteful to allow one and not the other and we should make a choice

31. This action is part of the consolidated case; Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. 02-M-1662 (D.
Colo. filed Oct. 28, 2002).
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